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Actually existing Chinese matriarchy 
 
Charles Stafford, London School of Economics 
 
 
 
Having read, as a graduate student, about the patrilineal and patriarchal foundations of 
Chinese society, I was a little disconcerted when I got to know my first real Taiwanese 
family – this was back in 1987 – and realised that, so far as I could tell, there were no 
men in it.   
 
I suppose I was, at least to some extent, in the position of the naïve reader mentioned by 
Francesca Bray, the type ‘acquainted only with stereotypical images of “traditional” 
Chinese women as dependent victims of patriarchy cut off from the significant male 
stage…’ (1997:370).   I’d been living for a few weeks in the teacher’s dormitory of the 
lower middle school in Angang, a rural Taiwanese township, which I’d been told was a 
highly conservative  and traditional kind of place.  Schools being intrinsically dull, I 
started following the lead of the more adventurous students in jumping the fence and 
spending my afternoons loitering in the surrounding village. Adjacent to the school there 
was a small food shop run by a woman and (in rotation) her four daughters, all of whom 
were high school age or above.  They were a force of nature.  The mother was a smart 
and ambitious operator, and she and her daughters ran a tight ship.  They were also 
extremely warm-hearted and funny, and the local people seemed to like and admire them 
very much.  The mother clearly loved her daughters, and amongst other things invested 
heavily in their schooling.  I spent a pleasant hour or two in their shop most days, 
sometimes helping them roll betel nuts in leaves for their steady stream of customers.   
 
Eventually I did learn that they were, in some respects, an anomalous family unit.  The 
township was overwhelmingly “Hokkien” Taiwanese (almost all residents were 
descendants of migrants from Quanzhou prefecture in Fujian), and yet the mother was 
from a Hakka background, while her husband – from whom she appeared to be 
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irreconcilably separated – was a “mainlander”.  For most of my fieldwork period, he was 
living elsewhere in Taiwan.   As a result, mother and daughters effectively operated in a 
world of their own, with what seemed to be complete autonomy.  From what I could see, 
the mother ran the show.   
 
Of course, their autonomy – and, by extension, the lack of subordination they 
experienced as women – is a matter of perspective.   Thanks to her “mainlander” 
husband, the girls’ mother had, after all, left her natal community far behind, and in her 
new place of residence she had neither his nor her kin to rely on. I also never learned 
much about the financial basis of the couple’s separation.  It’s possible, and perhaps even 
likely, that the husband had a claim on the profits of the shop in which his wife worked 
so hard.  It might have also been the case (although I have no evidence of this) that their 
separation was caused partly by her failure to conceive a son.  I do know that she, for her 
part, regretted not having a son, and at one point had even notionally “adopted” a local 
military service cadet as a kind of consolation prize.  
 
Bearing all of this in mind, what still impressed me most at the time, rightly or wrongly, 
was the extent to which these bright, articulate and assertive women appeared to be in 
control of their own lives.  To portray them in terms of patrilineal “failures” of various 
kinds would have seemed, to me, very odd.  In any case, because I was primarily 
interested in issues of learning and child development (cf. Stafford 1995), I found myself 
asking: what have these daughters, growing up in this particular family, learned along the 
way about Chinese family and kinship and gender?   
 
The second family I got to know was a more conventional one, at least in local terms.  
The middle-aged couple at the head of it were both “Hokkien” Taiwanese, and the 
husband (who ran a small construction business) was a local man by birth.  His father had 
died some years before.  But his elderly mother often lived with him in his house (as part 
of a “meal rotation” system for elderly support), and he also maintained close ties to his 
brother and sister, both of whom lived within a short walking distance.  However, his 
brother and sister didn’t live quite as close as his wife’s relatives – for it turned out that 
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she too had been born in Angang.  Indeed, his wife’s mother lived literally around the 
corner from them, and as far as I could tell the couple had more to do with her family 
than with his.  Perhaps partly as a result of this, the wife was, at least in my experience, 
extremely assertive with her husband; she certainly wasn’t dominated by him in any very 
obvious way.  
 
They had three children, two boys and a girl, who they doted on in various ways.  But at 
the time of my fieldwork the heaviest educational investment was being made in the 
daughter, simply because they considered her to be the smart one.  Again, I found myself 
asking: what have these children, with these parents, learned about Chinese family and 
kinship and gender?   
 
But allow me to cut a long story short.  As I moved around Angang, adding families to 
my vanishingly small sample, a pattern emerged.  This multi-surname community 
appeared to be a place with a fairly high degree of (township) endogamy, and quite a few 
uxorilocal marriages.  Affinal ties were as important, in most cases, as agnatic ones.  The 
daughters I met were unfailingly treated with warmth and love, and given 
uncompromising support – so far as I could tell from the evidence seen in everyday 
village life.   As you might expect, people in Angang did repeat to me the classic 
formulation that amongst the Chinese “men are more valued than women” (zhongnan 
qingnü).  But it was a little bit hard to see how children could actually believe such a 
thing, given their experience of the local world.  The adult women I met were, for the 
most part, assertive, bright and funny (sometimes obscenely so), and they seemed in 
many respects to be the equals, if not the betters, of the men around them.  Among other 
things, I was struck by their physical strength and, as I saw it, toughness.  I recall a 
fisherman joking roughly (if affectionately) with one woman – not a relative – about the 
fact that she was much too hard on her husband, to the extent of even hitting him if he got 
out of line.  She responded to this slur by shouting back at him and then eventually, when 
he wouldn’t stop the teasing, grabbing a slipper off the floor and whacking him, very 
hard, right on the top of his head.   
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Local people often told me, in the months that followed, that Angang women were 
known to be lihai – i.e. fierce, terrific, impressive.   What could explain this?  Clearly, the 
tendency for Angang women to live close to their natal families after marriage might 
have helped them resist domination by their husbands’ kin.i  Angang is also a fishing 
community, i.e. the kind of place in which anthropologists might reasonably expect 
agnatic kinship – not to mention the day-to-day subordination of women – to be relatively 
weak.ii   And of course this was Taiwan in the 1980s, not Shandong or Anhui or Sichuan 
during the Qing dynasty or earlier.  Why shouldn’t the Taiwanese women I met at the end 
of the 20th century, even in the countryside, have been relatively liberated?   Yet another 
possibility (one addressed in Ellen Judd’s contribution to this collection) is that the 
‘strength’ I saw in Angang women was itself, at least in part, a creative response to 
women’s subordinate roles in Chinese/Taiwanese society and culture.     
 
One afternoon, I found myself discussing all of this with a friend, a young artist from 
Taipei who had taken up residence in Angang for a couple of months.  She too found the 
local women remarkable.  But then she added that, after all, ‘China is a matriarchal 
society’.   For outsiders, she said, this might be difficult to see; but to her it was 
completely obvious.  
 
Women at the top 
 
Could she be right?  Surely China is, in fact, simply another one of the many places 
around the world in which “matriarchy” exists primarily as a negative fantasy – i.e. as an 
object lesson about the risks of giving too much power to women.  For instance, during 
the Tang dynasty, according to Jay, we find decidedly odd accounts of “kingdoms of 
women” at the edges of the Chinese world in which snakes, monkeys and ghosts are 
taken as husbands.  Then there are somewhat more plausible accounts of matriarchies or 
quasi-matriarchies in nearby Thailand, central Asia and Tibet, not to mention significant 
traditions of actual female rule in Japan and Korea.  In the latter two cases it was, 
tellingly, the introduction of solid Confucian standards from China that helped put an end 
to all that (Jay 1996).   
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 Meanwhile, within China itself, empress dowagers are known to have controlled affairs 
from “behind the curtain” during a number of dynasties, notably the Han, Northern Wei, 
Liao, Song, Yuan, and Qing.iii But as Yang Lien-sheng notes, this was criticised  
… as early as the Later Han period, when in 107 Tu Ken, a court gentleman, and 
one or more of his colleagues criticized Empress Dowager Teng and petitioned 
that she return governmental power to the Emperor.  Infuriated by this request, 
she ordered these gentlemen to be placed in heavy silk bags and beaten to death in 
the imperial court (Yang 1960:56-7).  
However, Tu Ken managed to survive this punishment and reportedly ‘fled to an obscure 
place where he served incognito as a waiter in a wine shop’.  He was later honoured for 
his actions and his story went on to provide ‘an inspiring example for literati-officials as 
late as the end of the Manchu dynasty’ – that is, incredibly, some 1750 years later (1960: 
57).   
 
Then there is Wu Zetian, the one woman in China who actually became emperor rather 
than ruling “behind the curtain” (for overviews, see Twichett & Wechsler 1979, Guisso 
1979).  She is said to have risen to power, in part, by killing her own infant daughter and 
blaming her main competitor, the empress Wang, for the terrible deed.  Once this plot 
succeeded, Wu Zetian reportedly had Wang and another enemy killed ‘by having their 
arms and legs cut off and leaving them to die in a wine vat’ (Twitchett & Wechsler 
1979:251).  As you might expect, however, it’s difficult to know what is true when it 
comes to accounts of this powerful woman.   As Jay observes, ‘traditional Chinese 
historians have condemned her short rule as an anomaly, a gender reversal and a violation 
of nature comparable to having hens instead of roosters crowing at dawn’ (Jay 1996:228).  
Jay also reminds us that, in any case, Wu Zetian 
… was neither a matriarch nor the head of a matriarchy.  The society remained 
patrilocal and patrilineal … Hers is a case in point that having a woman on the 
throne does not signal female dominance … (1996:228). 
 
The power of ordinary women 
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 So much, then, for matriarchy at the top.  But what about the world of ordinary mortals?  
Over the years, anthropologists of China and Taiwan have written a great deal about 
(ordinary) women’s power and influence, or the lack of it.  And it has always been 
recognised that women – and more specifically, married women with male children – 
could exercise very real power on the domestic front.  In an influential formulation, 
Freedman observed that: 
When we discuss the household and family … we cannot fail to take account of 
the importance of women (1958:32). 
But then he adds that: 
When we turn our attention to wider kinship units we may conveniently think of 
these groups as being composed primarily of men (1958: 32). 
It should be noted that for Freedman, as for others, the importance of women in domestic 
affairs (household and family) is intrinsically linked to their potential, as daughters-in-
law, to seriously exacerbate the strains of family life, and specifically to make worse the 
intrinsic rivalries between brothers with competing interests.  In short, women’s power, 
when it exists, is typically construed in negative terms and vis-à-vis patrilineal principles.   
 
Similarly, Emily Martin and Gary Seaman have discussed the fact that the real or 
imagined ability of women, as disruptive outsiders, to wreak havoc within their 
husbands’ families is sometimes given symbolic form in ideas about “dangerously 
polluting” menstrual fluids and childbirth (Ahern 1975, Seaman 1981).  And then, of 
course, Margery Wolf famously wrote about the influence (typically more benign, but 
sometimes not) which is exercised by Chinese mothers through their “uterine families”, 
and in particular through emotional entanglements with their sons.  But this exercise of 
power, Wolf suggests, is best understood as a subaltern coping mechanism: 
Women, in their struggle for some security in their day-to-day existence with the 
all-powerful male-oriented family and its larger organisation, the lineage, worked 
like termites hollowing out from within places for themselves and their 
descendants … Uterine families were in fact only a way of accommodating to the 
patriarchal family (Wolf 1985:11) 
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 Then there is Ellen Judd’s important research on the previously neglected topic of 
women’s ties to their natal families – something which, as I’ve already noted, may help 
mitigate patrilineal dominance – and her research on women’s very considerable agency 
in the context of China’s changing political-economy (Judd 1989, 1994, this collection).  
Judd remarks, however, that her informants in north China often only implicitly 
recognised women’s roles in making things happen, and that more generally ‘The culture 
of rural China is marked by a pervasive devaluation of women that is’ – ironically – 
‘constantly denied in the practice of everyday life’ (Judd 1994:254).   
 
In short, almost all anthropological discussions of Chinese women, including the ones 
which are specifically about their power and agency, have been centrally framed by the 
facts and/or ideologies of their subordination (at least beyond the domestic realm).  
Obviously, anthropologists have meanwhile stressed the great variability of Chinese 
gender relations over time and space, including during the late imperial and modern eras 
in which our research has been concentrated (notably Wolf 1985, Watson 1991, Davis & 
Harrell 1993, Judd 1994, Gates 1996, Bray 1997, Brandtstädter this volume).  However, 
most commentators agree that even the concerted post-imperial policies which have been 
explicitly intended to improve the lives of Chinese women, to help free them from 
patriarchy, have produced at best mixed outcomes, and in some cases may have made 
things even worse (Croll 2000).   
 
To be sure, images of powerful and autonomous women do sometimes come through in 
the literature and in everyday discourse.   Among a range of interesting examples, Gates 
cites the comment of a Hong Kong administrator in the early 1900s about ‘the 
paradoxical situation of the average [Chinese] farmer’s wife, who, being entirely at his 
mercy, rules him with a rod of iron’ (Gates 1996:198).  But isn’t this precisely the kind of 
joke which might be made – and in fact probably is made – with reference to women in 
every patriarchal society?   
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Undoubtedly to be taken seriously, however, is Yunxiang Yan’s account of changes over 
a period of fifty years to kinship, gender relations and “private life” in Xiajia, a farming 
community in Heilongjiang, northeast China (Yan 2003).  Yan describes, among many 
other things, the recent increase in households which, according to local people, are wife-
dominated – i.e. in which the wife “has the final say” (shuole suan), even in matters 
involving external relations.  The villagers suggest that whereas something like 19% of 
households are husband-dominated, a full 35% are wife-dominated, while in 46% percent 
they see husband and wife as having equal status. (Again, I wonder what children in the 
81% of households which are not husband-dominated learn about family and kinship and 
gender?)   
 
Yan accounts for these remarkable figures, in part, by telling us of dramatic changes to 
the status of the conjugal unit within Chinese kinship (2003:86-111), and of changes in 
particular to the position of women (as daughters, brides and wives) in relation to 
marriage transactions and family property (2003:140-161).  Speaking of what has 
transpired, he even goes so far as to refer to “the collapse of patriarchy” (2003:158).  But 
I suspect that many readers might doubt, in spite of Yan’s meticulous evidence, that 
things really could have taken such a dramatic turn.   This is because there is meanwhile, 
of course, plenty of evidence to suggest that the position of women in China and Taiwan 
remains problematic, even precarious.   
 
Consider evidence about educational attainment.   Broaded & Liu conclude that in urban 
China as recently as the mid-1990s girls whose abilities were equal to those of boys were, 
for a variety of reasons, aiming for lower academic qualifications. Since then things have 
almost certainly moved on.iv   But the informants of Broaded & Liu considered it risky 
for girls to follow academic tracks because they would, in any case, almost certainly be 
discriminated against in employment after graduation.  They also had to contend with the 
widely-held view that wives should not be more educated than their husbands.  As a 
result, they tended to systematically opt for, and/or be pushed towards, less prestigious 
vocational streams (Broaded & Liu 1996, see below).  Perhaps this isn’t evidence of 
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patriarchy, as such, but it is certainly symptomatic of recent discrimination against girls 
and women in education and employment.  
 
Or consider evidence that in spite of wholesale revisions of China’s marriage and 
property laws, ‘Traditional ideological constructs’ relating to women and property, and to 
women as property, ‘are very much alive today …’ (Ocko 1991:337).  Writing of the 
People’s Republic in 1991, Ocko says: 
There are still parents who attempt to determine (sometimes brutally) their 
daughters’ marriage choices …; husbands who, whether or not they have paid 
substantial betrothal gifts, continue to treat their wives as property over which 
authority has been conveyed to them by marriage …; and even kidnappers of and 
traffickers in women who persist in seeing women as a valuable commodity from 
which a profit can be made (1991:337). 
 
Then, of course, there is evidence about the resilience and even strengthening of some 
forms of son preference in recent years, during a period when overall fertility rates in 
China have declined markedly.  This is observed, among other things, in the fact that the 
“sex ratio at birth” has gone up dramatically above the norm since the 1980s in favour of 
boys, presumably through the use of pre-natal selection (Croll 2000:21-40).  It is also 
observed in the fact that although infant and child mortality has improved significantly 
since the 1950s, researchers have nevertheless found ‘an increasing disadvantage for 
females in survival’ relative to males (Li & Feldman 1995:9; Li et al 2004).   More 
specifically, a highly detailed study in one county found that girls who had sisters, or who 
had both brothers and sisters, had lower survival rates than those who did not – a result 
consistent with a son-biased “family building” strategy.  According to the researchers, 
‘The main mechanism of excess female child mortality’, as they refer to this 
phenomenon, ‘is lack of use and effectiveness of curative health care rather than nutrient 
deficiency or a lack of preventive health care’; but female infanticide is almost certainly a 
contributing cause (Li & Zhu 1999: 21; Li et al 2004).  The scale of the son preference 
issue is starkly conveyed in one statistic cited by Elisabeth Croll in her comprehensive 
overview of the position of “endangered daughters” in China and more generally in Asia.  
 9
Surveys in Hebei in the 1980s showed that, at that time, ‘If only one child was to be 
permitted [under family planning regulations] then a mere 2.2% [of the population] 
wanted a daughter’ (Croll 2000:22). 
 
Reconciling the conflicting evidence
 
Again, things may have moved on since then, and indeed almost certainly have done so 
in some respects, and in certain locations.  But how can we reconcile the undoubted 
evidence which does exist of ongoing discrimination against girls and women (in 
schooling, property, health, etc.) with Yan’s observations about the “collapse of 
patriarchy” in Xiajia, or my own observations about the power and autonomy of (at least 
some) women in Angang?    
 
One consideration, already mentioned above, is that women’s status might vary not only 
in time (e.g. before and after the introduction of new birth control policies or new 
marriage laws) but also in space.  As I pointed out, my Taiwan fieldwork site of Angang 
– with its “fierce, terrific, impressive” women – is marked by a high degree of endogamy 
and uxorilocal residence.   For this reason, I was particularly interested to read the 
demographic research of Li et al (1998) about the transmission of son preference in two 
counties in Shaanxi during the 1990s. They suggest that one of these counties, Sanyuan, 
exhibits ‘the core elements of the traditional Yellow River culture’, with large family 
clans, a ‘strict patriarchal family system’, patrilocal marriage, few adoptions, etc.  Here 
the sex ratio at birth (SRB) for 1990-96 ‘was as high as 117 [meaning 117 boys were 
born for every 100 girls], much higher than the normal worldwide SRB of 105-107’.  In 
multi-surname Lueyang county, by contrast, large family clans are ‘few and unimportant 
to village life’, the patriarchal system is weak, there are a large number of uxorilocal 
marriages, and there is a high rate of adoption.  As a result, son preference in Lueyang 
appears to be weak, as evidenced by a sex ratio at birth of only 105 – which, as the 
authors point out, is ‘quite normal [by world standards] and very different from that in 
Sanyuan’ (Li et al 1998:4-6; cf. Li et al 2000, 2003).  In brief, one implication of this 
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demographic research is that people in Lueyang appear to have learned, from the 
evidence of their own senses, that daughters, after all, are as good as sons.   
 
Perhaps one could say that if Chinese patriarchy, and all that goes with it, were to 
collapse in Lueyang county, it wouldn’t have too far to fall.  And the same might be said 
for my Taiwanese fieldwork township, Angang, and (from what I understand) of Xiajia 
village, where Yunxiang Yan conducted his research.  For it turns out that Xiajia, too, is a 
multi-surname community where ‘village endogamy has been practiced for several 
generations’, with the result that ‘many villagers are bound by affinal ties’ rather than 
agnatic ones (Yan 2003:37).  The authority of patrilineages there is notably weak.   Under 
these circumstances – specific to given communities at given times – we might expect the 
ability of women to participate in, and even dominate, domestic and public life to be 
enhanced. 
 
Consider, by way of contrast, the township of Protected Mountain, in western Yunnan, 
where I carried out research in 2000-01.  (See also the very interesting comparison, in 
terms of kinship and gender, between two villages with differing political-economic 
histories in Brandtstädter’s contribution to this collection.)  Protected Mountain is a place 
in which lineages exist in a very substantive way (with ancestral halls, corporate worship, 
etc) and where patriarchal ideals and Confucian rhetoric are very strongly in evidence.   I 
was told that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when out-migration to Burma 
(Myanmar) was common from this township, wives were expected to sit dutifully at 
home – sometimes for decades at a time – serving their husbands’ parents.  Such women 
were sometimes called “living widows” (huo gua): that is, even though their husbands 
were alive (and in many cases had taken second wives in Burma) the women were meant 
to act out the chaste and sombre life of a widow back at home.  As a result, people in this 
region are said to have warned each other: 
Don’t give your daughters to Protected Mountain! 
A whole lifetime playing the widow, 
and then half a lifetime actually being a widow!v
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Having said this, one of the first public events I witnessed there was the funeral of a 
woman who, precisely, had gone with her husband in the 1940s to Burma, where they 
jointly ran a successful business.  She had returned to China in order to die at home and 
be buried next to her husband – who predeceased her – and in the event she was given a 
spectacular and expensive funerary send-off.  From everything I heard about this woman, 
it seemed clear that she had led a remarkable life, and was far from being the retiring wife 
who lived in her husband’s shadow.  More generally, I think it would be seriously 
misleading to juxtapose, in a simplistic way, Angang (as a modern, non-patriarchal place, 
where women have autonomy and power) with Protected Mountain (as an old-fashioned, 
lineage-oriented place where women submit to men).  Among other things, it should be 
noted that women from Protected Mountain, back in the Republican era, actually attained 
higher levels of education than would have been the norm in the Chinese countryside, 
and that the township had a strong “reforming” movement directed precisely towards 
(among other things) women’s liberation.   
 
In Protected Mountain, too, I met a number of powerful and impressive women, 
including one who was so tough, especially when it came to business deals, that behind 
her back she was jokingly referred to as the “Iron Goddess”.   At the opposite end of the 
social scale, I met the married-in wife of a pig farmer.  This incredibly jovial woman 
made a considerable amount of money in the reform era by walking many miles every 
day to sell cooked food to men who were working on construction projects.  Her husband 
openly acknowledged her talent at business and human relations – including a talent for 
enduring hard work without complaint.  I was told by others that she was, without doubt, 
the “boss” of this particular family.  She had, among other things, invested very heavily 
in education and healthcare for her daughter (who had been seriously ill).  
 
My point is that although Protected Mountain is, in some ways, more obviously 
patriarchal in outlook than Angang, I could easily produce, from my fieldnotes, a 
narrative about the (publicly acknowledged) power and influence of women there.  And 
even if demographic research proved that, for instance, son preference is stronger there 
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than in Angang, the power and influence of women in lineage-oriented Protected 
Mountain would still, I think, require explanation.     
 
In other words, I’m trying to suggest that the illustrations of “impressive” women given 
at the start of this paper – drawn from fieldwork in Angang – might not be as exceptional 
across time or space as they might at first seem.  In support of this, one might note the 
recent evidence that “modern”, and heavily “westernised”, Taiwan is in fact more 
culturally conservative in some respects than the People’s Republic, including in ways 
that impinge directly on the autonomy of women there.   In a fascinating article, Martin 
Whyte has suggested that support for the urban elderly in Taiwan may actually follow a 
more traditional pattern than it does in China.  The young Taiwanese women in his 
sample are more likely than their Chinese counterparts to live with their parents-in-law.  
They are also more likely to be either unemployed or employed by family firms – and 
thus to end up with primary responsibility for the care of their husbands’ parents (Whyte 
2004).  Certainly, the community of Angang, in spite of its tough and seemingly liberated 
women, is said – both by local people and by those from outside – to be an unusually 
conservative kind of place, one in which Daoist and Buddhist and Confucian ideals 
heavily organise everyday life for many residents.  As one outsider (a person from Taipei 
sent to work in the local government) remarked to me, ‘The people here ask the gods 
before they do anything – even going for a walk’.  It was only a slight exaggeration.  
Women in Angang appear to have power and autonomy, but they spend an awful lot of 
their time and energy worshipping gods and visiting spirit mediums, thereby helping to 
reproduce and spread the (generally conservative) values and precepts of Chinese popular 
religion.   
 
Reproducing patriarchy?
 
Obviously, women sometimes exercise their agency in ways amenable to patriarchy.  But 
perhaps it is useful to distinguish, as many authors have at least implicitly done, between 
the “ideological” and “pragmatic” reasons behind this (these are ideal types, of course, 
and typically merged in practice).  On the one hand, a woman might sincerely believe, 
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thanks to a kind of indoctrination, that men are intrinsically superior, that it is morally 
right for patrilines to be continued ad infinitum, and that her primary job on earth is to 
bear and nurture sons.  (The actual production of the desires and dispositions that 
underpin patriliny is, of course, a hugely complex business; cf. the thought-provoking 
discussion by Sangren 2003.)  On the other hand, a woman might recognise that women 
are just as good (and bad) as men, that patrilines come and go, and that there’s more to 
life than making sons for somebody else’s family.  Still – given the realpolitik of Chinese 
gender, notably the facts about old age security for rural women – she might conclude 
that, all things considered, she prefers to have a son.  Perhaps the practicalities help blur 
the more far-fetched claims of the ideologies?  
 
With reference to the research on girls’ educational attainment I noted above, a similar 
distinction between “ideological” and “pragmatic” motivations can be made.  The authors 
suggest that mothers with high levels of education may have been ‘instrumental in 
reinforcing gender differences in high school enrolment patterns, nudging sons toward 
[academic] schools and daughters toward [vocational] schools’ (Broaded & Liu 1996:77).  
Similarly, they find that mothers with “intellectual” jobs (e.g. lower-grade professionals) 
tend not to encourage their daughters to pursue academically-oriented subjects.  Is this 
because they actually believe the stereotypes implicit in Chinese gender ideologies?  
Perhaps, but the authors stress more pragmatic concerns, or at least a combination of the 
two: 
One wonders whether the reason [for not encouraging daughters] might lie in 
intellectual mothers’ assessments of the relative risks of commitment to the academic 
track for boys and girls.  Intellectual mothers are, after all, in the best position to 
assess from personal experience both the costs and the benefits of pursuing higher 
levels of academic schooling and the intellectual careers to which such schooling may 
lead.  Awareness of pervasive male preference in the workforce, coupled with 
concerns about the marriageability of highly educated daughters, might lead some 
intellectual mothers to discourage their academically capable daughters from 
following in their footsteps.  It is also possible, of course, that daughters draw these 
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kinds of conclusions from their observations of their mothers’ experiences, without 
the mothers advocating any particular course of action (1996:80-1).vi   
 
At this point – i.e. on the question of what conclusions daughters might draw from 
experience – let me return to where I started, with my first real Taiwanese family: a 
mother and her four daughters.  Given that, as I’ve said, the mother appeared to be 
irreconcilably separated from her husband, I was somehow a bit surprised (although I 
probably shouldn’t have been) to learn that she continued to worship one of his ancestors 
at the altar in her home.  This was not simply an occasional thing.  The ancestor was 
honoured by a wooden tablet placed on the domestic altar, next to the Buddhist and 
Daoist gods she worshipped.  Every day she burned incense for them all, and showed 
them all respect.  Rather like her stated disappointment in not having a son (which I’m 
convinced was genuinely experienced as a failure), this seemed a confirmation that 
China’s patrilineal ideologies – in spite of her apparent independence and autonomy – 
were continuing to define her life.  But the reality is a bit more complex, as I later learned 
from the daughters, and in some ways it relates to some very “pragmatic” issues.  Briefly, 
it seems that during childhood, and for prolonged periods, one of the four girls had been 
seriously ill.  At the time, her mother consulted a spirit medium about this problem, and 
the medium quickly identified the source of it – her husband’s deceased father.  As a 
father-in-law whose spirit was not being properly nurtured (thanks to her husband’s 
rushed departure from the mainland), he caused the girl’s illness.  A tablet was thus 
produced for him, and placed on the family altar – almost certainly not at her husband’s 
insistence.  One could say, I suppose, that she was deluded in offering incense to it, but I 
wonder to what extent she was deluded specifically in the service of patriarchy.  (And 
what did her daughters learn?  That their mother respected their father’s patriline?  I 
doubt it: they themselves appeared to have little respect for their father.)   
 
Discussion: women’s actual power 
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Since 1987, I’ve conducted fieldwork in four different places – two in Taiwan, two in 
China.  Of these four places, I would make the following (perhaps rather predictable) 
statements:  
(1) That women play important roles in enacting and thus reproducing traditional 
values, including those associated with religion, patriarchy and patriliny; 
(2) That they have both “ideological” and “pragmatic” reasons for so doing;  
(3) That no boy or girl growing up in these places could possibly avoid learning that 
women are typically strong, tough and impressive, and that they often dominate 
men. 
On the last point, it probably helps, in the specific case of Angang, that “private” life 
tends to be relatively public there, so that domestic issues are frequently aired in full view 
of the world, thus revealing to children some of the complexities of the balance of gender 
power – and not only in their parents’ households.  For example, at spirit medium 
sessions (which even very young children often attend) family matters of various kinds 
may be discussed openly – if sometimes a bit too poetically for easy comprehension.  
Probably easier for children to follow is the (often good-natured, sometimes more 
serious) bickering between husbands and wives which occurs on the streets and back 
alleys of the township, or in the family sitting rooms which are effectively public 
thoroughfares.  The soap opera of township life is recounted here and elsewhere, and 
moral judgements passed around for public consumption.  In much of this, at least in my 
experience, women often have the upper hand, and they seldom show signs of being 
seriously intimated by the men around them, including the senior ones.  To the extent that 
real women have substantive power, at least in the context of “private life”, children 
surely know it.   
 
Boys and girls in Angang could also not help but learn, from years of direct observation, 
that many women are highly effective economic agents (hard workers and skilled 
businesspeople), and (in the Taiwanese economy, where so many firms are family firms) 
they could not help but connect domestic economic activity and family life with the wider 
economic world beyond the borders of the township.   
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It is also the case that they inevitably encounter, in various contexts, what might be called 
the “mother worshipping” tendency in the Chinese cultural tradition.  This is clearly 
observable in religious practice (especially in the worship of Mazu), but also (as 
conveyed by things like school textbooks) in the veneration of the mothers of historical 
figures as diverse as Mencius and Chiang Kai-shek.  To the extent that the Chinese 
tradition openly reveres women, especially as mothers – whether as a matter of popular 
sentiment or national orthodoxy – children surely know it.   
 
Then there is something else that boys and girls in Angang (but also in my other three 
fieldwork locations) unfailingly encounter throughout childhood, which centrally 
involves women – but this is a rather complex and diffuse thing, one which is difficult to 
explain in a sentence or two.   Basically: women are observably key agents in the 
production of relatedness, and especially of the intense emotions associated with it (see 
Stafford 2000a, 2000b, 2003; see also the comments on women and emotion/affect in the 
papers by Friedman and Brandtstädter, this collection).  Of course, every child will 
eventually encounter the idea that who you are, in kinship terms, is effectively given to 
you by birth or marriage or adoption into a patrilineal unit.  But they will also know, from 
direct experience which starts very early in life, that within the main cycles of familial 
and communal reciprocity – where relatedness (including of the patrilineal kind) is 
explicitly seen to be produced by human action – it is women who typically have the 
pivotal roles.  Most obviously, women have responsibility for the nurturing and care 
(yang) of children themselves, and are also frequently responsible for the day-to-day 
nurturing and care of parents, parents-in-law and grandchildren, as well as the broadening 
of ties to others beyond the scope of the family.vii
 
For these various reasons, but especially because of their roles in the production of 
relatedness, I want to suggest that in places like Angang – but also in more lineage-
oriented places such as Protected Mountain – children cannot help but encounter and 
learn about a form of actually existing Chinese matriarchy.  
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Of course, if by the term matriarchy we can only mean a way of life based around 
matrilineal descent and/or matrilocal residence and/or political power being solely in the 
hands of women, then the term could hardly apply to Angang.  But if we mean a way of 
life in which considerable power and authority is vested in women (and in wives and 
mothers in particular) to the extent that they often “have the final say” over men, 
including in public discussions, while also often significantly dominating the emotional 
dispositions and outlook of their children, then there is something worth exploring – not 
only, I would say, in Angang and Protected Mountain, but also potentially much more 
widely in China and Taiwan.   
 
The importance of women in the domestic realm – and specifically in their roles vis-à-vis 
children – has never been doubted by anthropologists of China.  But I’m not referring 
here to a kind of hidden power, nor to one that is unremarked, nor to one that can be 
construed primarily as a form of “resistance”.   If this is a secret, it is an open secret.  
More to the point: all people – male and female – observe and learn about this 
matriarchy, years before they become experts in anything resembling patrilineal ideology.  
To put it in Bourdieu’s terms, their “primary habitus” is often, I think, heavily 
matriarchal in orientation.   (For this reason, by the way, the idea that household and 
family can be separated out from Chinese kinship – as if a distinction of this kind would 
be made in the minds of our informants, all of whom started life as children – strikes me 
as highly implausible.) 
 
But has this phenomenon really been overlooked?  
 
Taking a long historical view, Francesca Bray writes of the extent to which Chinese 
perspectives on the domestic realm, and on the proper roles of women, have varied 
significantly across imperial history and between different classes (Bray 1997, see also 
her contribution to this collection).   She finds especially significant, for instance, the 
process whereby “a revised view of women” emerged during the Ming and Qing, one in 
which “reproductive roles were much more prominent than productive roles” (1997:272).  
However Bray is keen to stress, throughout her survey of these transformations, that 
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women’s activities as producers and reproducers were an essential, indeed foundational, 
element in the creation of a “distinctively Chinese civility” – and, crucially, that they 
were always seen to be so within China (1997:371).    
 
A similar point is made by Gail Hershatter in a highly thought-provoking paper on the 
fate of “the private” in revolutionary China.  She notes the undoubted (and sometimes 
extreme) limits set on women’s freedoms in imperial China, but then observes that: 
… at the heart of imperial political thought was the precept that activities and 
values inculcated in the family, usually by women, were the very foundation of 
social order and state function.  The domestic, in this sense, was not at all private.  
Women’s role in household production was also linked to a wider public world.  
Late imperial statecraft writers ceaselessly promoted women’s handicraft labor as 
crucial to the health of the agrarian economy and hence the stability of the state 
itself.  Imperial state officials did not stop exhorting, rewarding, or regulating at 
the gate to a “private” or domestic realm.  On the contrary, they regarded this 
realm both as the foundation of their power and as an appropriate subject for their 
encomia (Hershatter 2003:258). 
 
But then, according to Hershatter, political activism in the early 20th century produced a 
new outlook on all of this, generating an unrelentingly negative evaluation of the 
domestic/traditional realm, and of women’s (by definition, exploited) role within it 
(Hershatter 2003:259).  Eventually, she suggests, the socialist state came to deprive “the 
domestic realm of causative status”: 
No longer a major location from which modernity was supposed to emerge, the 
domestic was regarded as a merely residual, reactive realm of human activity.  
Hidden from history, unvoiced, it became, arguably for the first time in Chinese 
history, private (2003:262). 
I suppose I wonder, among many other things, to what extent this perspective – as filtered 
through our post-imperial informants in both China and Taiwan – has influenced 
anthropological perspectives, leading us to misconstrue women’s roles both now and in 
the past.  
 19
REFERENCES  
 
Acheson, J.M. (1981) ‘Anthropology of fishing’, Annual review of anthropology 
10:275:316.  
 
Bray, F. (1997) Technology and gender: fabrics of power in late imperial China, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Broaded, C.M. and Liu, C. (1996) ‘Gender and educational attainment in urban China’, 
China Quarterly, 145:53-86. 
 
Croll, E. (2000) Endangered daughters: discrimination and development, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Davis, D. and Harrell, S. (1993) Chinese families in the post-Mao era, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
Ebrey, P. “Succession to high office: the Chinese case”, in M. Cole and D. R. Olson 
(eds), Technology, literacy and the evolution of society, pp. 49-71.   
 
Gates, H. (1996), China’s motor: a thousand years of petty capitalism, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Guisso, W.L. (1979) ‘The reigns of the Empress Wu, Chung-tsung and Jui-tsung’, in D. 
Twitchett (ed) The Cambridge History of China, Volume 3, Sui and T’ang China, 589-
906 AD, Part One, pp. 290-332. 
 
Hershatter, G. (2003) ‘Making the visible invisible: the fate of “the private” in 
revolutionary China’, in F. Lu (ed), Wusheng zhi sheng (I): jindai Zhongguo de funü yu 
guojia (1600-1950) [Voices amid silence (I): women and the nation in modern China 
(1600-1950)], Taiwan: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, pp.257-281. 
 20
 Hom, M.K. (1987), Songs of Gold Mountain: Cantonese rhymes from San Francisco 
Chinatown, Berkeley: University of California Press.   
 
Jay, J.W. (1996) ‘Imagining matriarchy: “kingdoms of women” in Tang China’, Journal 
of the American Oriental Society, 116(2):220-229. 
 
Judd, E. (1989) ‘Niangjia: Chinese women and their natal families’, Journal of Asian 
studies, 48(3):525-44. 
 
Judd, E. (1994) Gender and power in rural north China, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
 
Li, S. and Feldman, M.W. (1995), ‘Sex differentials in infant and child mortality in 
China: levels, trends, and variations’, Morrison Institute for Population and Resource 
Studies, Stanford University, Working Paper 61. 
 
Li, S., Feldman, M.W., Li, N. and Zhu, C. (1998), ‘A survey of transmission of son 
preference in two counties of Shaanxi, China’, Morrison Institute for Population and 
Resource Studies, Stanford University, Working Paper 75. 
 
Li, S and Zhu, C. (1999) ‘Gender differences in child survival in rural China: a county 
study’, Morrison Institute for Population and Resource Studies, Stanford University, 
Working Paper 80. 
 
Li, S., Feldman, M.W. and Li, N. (2000), ‘Cultural transmission of uxorilocal marriage in 
Lueyang, China’, Journal of family history 25(2):158-177. 
 
Li, S., Feldman, M.W. and Li, N. (2003) ‘Acceptance of two types of uxorilocal marrage 
in contemporary rural China: the case of Lueyang’, Journal of family history 28(2):314-
333. 
 21
 Li, S., Zhu, C. and Feldman, M.W. (2004) ‘Gender differences in child survival in 
contemporary China: a county study’, Journal of biological sciences 36:83-109. 
 
Ocko, J.K. (1991) ‘Women, property and law in the People’s Republic of China’, in R.S. 
Watson and P.B. Ebrey (eds), Marriage and inequality in Chinese society, pp.313-346. 
 
Sangren, P.S. (2003), ‘Separations, autonomy and recognition in the production of gender 
differences: reflections from considerations of myths and laments’, in C. Stafford (ed), 
Living with separation in China: anthropological accounts, London: Routledge Curzon, 
pp. 53-84. 
 
Stafford, C. (1995) The roads of Chinese childhood, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Stafford, C. (2000a) Separation and reunion in modern China, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Stafford, C. (2000b), ‘Chinese patriliny and the cycles of yang and laiwang’, in J. Carsten 
(ed), Cultures of relatedness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37-54. 
 
Stafford, C. (ed) (2003) Living with separation in China: anthropological accounts, 
London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
 
Twitchett, D. and Wechsler, H.J. (1979) ‘Kao-tsung (reign 649-83) and the Empress Wu: 
the inheritor and the usurper’, in D. Twitchett (ed), The Cambridge History of China, 
Volume 3, Sui and T’ang China, 589-906 AD, Part One, pp.242-289. 
 
Watson, R. (1991) ‘Afterword: marriage and gender inequality’, in R.S. Watson and P.B. 
Ebrey (eds), Marriage and inequality in Chinese society, pp.347-368. 
 
 22
Whyte, M.K. (2004) ‘Filial obligations in Chinese families: paradoxes of modernization’, 
in C. Ikels (ed), Filial piety: practice and discourse in contemporary East Asia, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, pp.106-127. 
 
Wolf, M. (1985) Revolution postponed: women in contemporary China, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
 
Yan, Y. (2003) Private life under socialism: love, intimacy and family change in a 
Chinese village: 1949-1999, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Yang, L.S. (1960-61) ‘Female rulers in imperial China’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic 
Studies, 23:47-61. 
                                                 
i Although note the comments by Ellen Judd (this collection) about some of the 
disadvantages, for women, of uxorilocal marriage arrangements.  In other words, staying 
close to one’s natal kin should not be assumed to be uniformly beneficial for women.  
ii This is by contrast with farming communities, where the need to control land is often 
thought to increase the need to control women (cf. Acheson 1981.)   
iii Note that, as Patricia Ebrey explains, it was common for elite women – and elite 
widows in particular – to play crucial rules in the Chinese system of succession to high 
office (Ebrey 2005).   
iv Andrew Kipnis notes, for example, that in his recent research on education in China the 
increasing importance of daughters’ education was strikingly evident (personal 
communication and his essay in this collection).   
v See also Hom (1987:111-147) for comparable lamentations about wives who were left 
behind when their husbands “sojourned” to San Francisco. 
vi As noted above (endnote iv), Andrew Kipnis’s recent research suggests that attitudes 
towards daughters’ education is changing, seemingly very rapidly, in at least some places 
in China.  However I cite this (earlier) research because it relates to the way in which a 
version of patriarchal conservatism – or, more simply, the expectation that women’s 
possibilities will be more constrained than those of men – can be reproduced by women.   
vii Although note the important comments by Bray in this collection, on the striking 
historical variation in women’s parenting roles and also in the social valuation of these 
roles.  
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